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LOOKING FOR COMMON GROUND 
UNIVERSALISM VS. RELATIVISM IN THE 
INTERCULTURAL HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 
Juha-Pekka Rentto 
One of the most persistent aspects of the modern human rights 
debate has been the controversy between those moral univer-
salists who think that the human rights -as interpreted by the 
liberal Western philosophers, defended by the liberal Western 
jurists, propagated by the liberal Western politicians, and adored 
by the liberal Western press- reflect a universally valid morality 
which ought to be adopted without qualification by all human 
nations all over the world; and those moral relativists who, on the 
contrary, think that the human rights morality is a cultural 
product which does not apply to aH societies, not at least in the 
same way in which it is pertinent to modern Western society. 
Even if it is often implicitly assumed that the difference 
obtains between Western universalists and non-Western rela-
tivists, it is not necessarily so. Not even all Westerners believe in 
the universal validity of their prevalent morality: relativism is, 
after aH, part of the common stock of Western inteHectual history 
ever since the ancient Greeks l . It is often said that the modern 
1. The sophists are often mentioned as early doctrinal relativists. But also a 
philosopher like Aristotle, who clearly opposed moral relativism, propounded a 
political relativism which made the laws of a city depend on e.g. its environ-
mental circumstances. 
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history of relativism begins with Montesquieu's theory according 
to which different c1imatic, economic and cultural conditions 
quite naturally lead to different moral and political norms2. 
Where the human rights are concemed, a relativist to-day would 
point out that they may have been an appropriate response to the 
historical circumstances of the West and they may still continue 
to be a suitable method of coping with the present problems of 
Westem liberal society. Nevertheless, history c1early shows that 
the human rights have not spontaneously emerged in other 
cultures of the world. Quite obviously their circumstances have 
been different, and they have developed quite different moral 
strategies for coping with the problems pertinent to their kind of 
society. The human rights are therefore for them an alien solution 
which answers the wrong problems. If so, people who adopt the 
alien doctrine of human rights mn the risk of being alienated from 
their own culture and losing the chance to live their lives 
according to their own values. From this perspective an indis-
criminate export of human rights ideology can be seen as a kind 
of cultural imperialism which threatens the integrity of non-
Westem cultures and promotes a worldwide hegemony of 
Westem individualism, liberalism and consumerism. When 
Westem relativists present arguments like this, they are often 
criticized for na"iveté: blinded by the beauty of that which they 
cannot properly understand they fail to see the reality which has 
little to do with the polished official fa9ade adomed with a 
suitable selection of mystified traditional doctrines. When again 
Eastem relativists argue in this manner, they are equally often 
criticized for playing mthlessly into the hands of immoral tyrants 
and unjust govemments which merely use the traditions of the 
land as a plain pretext for personal gain or continued oppression. 
2. Montesquieu's foundations are universalistic, though: he sees the local 
differences as reflections for a universal human normativity, a law of nature, 
which takes various appearances in different circumstances; see De l' esprit des 
Lois,I, 1-3_ 
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On the other hand, even if non-Westem crities from a 
defensive point of view may argue that there is no relation 
between the Westem human rights doctrine and their own culture, 
they are not for that reason alone relativists inside out: it is quite 
normal that each side to the dispute believes that he pos ses ses the 
universally valid moral truth. It would be a very interesting topie 
to investigate into the reasons why non-Westem cultures rarely 
have a keen interest in proselytizing among other nations. 
Perhaps it has to do with faith in their own superiority: members 
of alien cultures perhaps appear' for them uneducated, even 
uneducable, barbarians who are not fit to live by the elevated 
standards of local traditional morality. Indeed, as 1 have in sorne 
detail argued elsewhere3, critics of Westem human rights doctrine 
quite cornmonly argue from their various cultural viewpoints that 
the human rights have irnmoral implications, or that they lead to a 
deterioration of popular morality. Westemers, too, argue 
sometimes equally elitistically that non-Westem societies are not 
quite mature for the human rights, wherefore les s stringent 
standards ought to apply to them than to uso This notion conceals 
the implicit assumption that it is precisely the Westem liberal 
society which represents the epitome of historical development. 
The task of thepresent essay is not to find out whether the 
liberal human rights doctrine is universally valid or not. Instead 
we shall focus our attention on a more general problem regarding 
the controversy over relativism at large: is there a way in which 
cultural relativism can be a plausible starting point and platform 
for a meaningful intercultural discourse on human rights -related 
issues? We shall first outline sorne of the most common 
arguments brought forward in favour of acknowledging that 
3. See RENTIO, "Natural Law and natural rights revisited. On 
(dis)connecting different juridical traditions", Persona y Derecho, Vol. 30 
(277-320); and RENTIO, "Quo vadis, Europa? A Query Concerning the 
Foundations of the Western Civilization", The Finnish Yearbook of 
International Law 2000 (to be published shortly). 
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cultural differences are relevant for the evaluation of human 
rights doctrine. Then we shall discuss a number of usual 
arguments produced by universalists in order to show that 
relativism is an unsound position. The results of this dicussion 
will hopefully lead us to understand that a position beyond the 
superficial opposition between universal and relativism is 
necessary if we are to find a genuine and fruitful basis for a 
mutual understanding between different moral cultures. 
WHAT IS CULTURAL MORAL RELA TIVISM? 
Moral relativism basically observes that different people have 
different moral beliefs, and explains this with reference to 
differences in their conditions or circumstances. An extreme form 
of relativism is subjectivism, according to which each human 
subject has his own moral beliefs which are true for him and for 
noone else. More moderate relativists talk about social 
conditions, educational factors, cultural affiliation and the like as 
determinants of a person's moral beliefs: each person belongs 
to a context which to a great extent defines the relevant moral 
questions for him. Philosophical hermenutics -inasmuch as it 
believes that understanding is ultimately based on an unar-
ticulated foreknowledge shared between the members of a group 
who understand each other- is a sophisticated version of 
relativismo In the present essay we are primarily interested in the 
elaim that cultural affiliation determines one's moral beliefs so 
that members of different moral cultures therefore have different 
criteria for moral truth. Moral universalism, on the contrary, will 
elaim that in the last analysis, despite apparent differences, there 
is one true morality which is common to all men regardless of 
their cultural affiliation or other contextual conditions. 
But even if culture-bound differences in actual moral beliefs 
exist, various explanations for such differences offer themselves 
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which are ultimately compatible with moral universalismo David 
B. Wong mentions several of them4: . firstly, differerice can 
depend on error or ignorance. This is a point made QY innu-
merable authors in all times. Let me only mention St. Thomas 
who often points out that something is not understandable to the 
"rude". Ignorance or error can relate to either fact or value. 
Secondly, difference can depend on different factual conditions 
and circumstances. This point has a long history Ín political 
theory ever since Aristotle fathered the theory of "mixed 
government"5 which was later passed on to future generations by 
Cicero6: a good government was one that employed a mix of 
methods which best answered the demands placed on it by 
political, reconomic and natural circumstances. Thirdly, it may be 
accidentally impossible with our present knowledge and powers 
to resolve all moral differences in a definite manner, but even so, 
one true morality can exist despite apparentIy irresolvable 
differences in opinion. A genuine relativism should deny all these 
explanations. According to Wong7, such a relativism should 
as sume that a cultural environment can directly influence the 
degree in which a person finds an activity rewarding . and 
encourage him in sorne projects of becoming good but not others. 
This would not entirely prec1ude the possibility that there is a 
fixed human nature which is invariant in all cultural environ-
ments, but it should be assumed that even if we had such a nature 
it would be insufficiently determínate to justify one determínate 
good which all rational and informed persons would find equally 
rewarding regardless of cultural affiliation. 
4. See WONG, Moral Relativity, University of California Press, Berkeley 
and Los Angeles, CA., 1984, p. 117 pp. Wong substitutes t~e terrn "abso-
.lutism" for "universalism", but for all practical purposes he is dealing with the 
same problem as we. 
5. Politics IV, 10-11. 
6. De Re publica 11, 23. 
7. WONG, op.cit., p. 158. 
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It seems, nevertheless, that not even Wong manages to escape 
universalismo Hear verbatim what he says8: "Human beings have 
needs to resolve internal conflicts between requirements and to 
resolve interpersonal conflicts of interests. There are constraints 
on what a morality could be like and still serve those needs. 
These constraints are derived from the physical environment, 
from human nature, and from standards of rationality, but they 
are not enough to eliminate all but one morality as meeting those 
needs. Moral relativity is an indication of the plasticity of human 
nature, of the power of ways of life to determine what constitutes 
a satisfactory resolution of the conflicts morality is intended to 
resolve". His view is genuinely relativistic only upon two 
intertwining assumptions concerning the nature and function of 
morality, viz that one moral theory is not open to alternative 
solutions, and that the function of a moral theory is precisely to 
yield determinate and univocal solutions to particular problems. 
These assumptions can be questioned: for instance the morality 
proposed by the so called new school of natural law cannot even 
be expected to yield very many univocally determinate particular 
solutions because it radicates in a set of mutually incom-
mensurate and equally fundamental basic goods which can leave 
room for more than one right solution to most problems9. 
Besides, even Aristotle seems to have accepted that "such as one 
is, such will the end seem to one", suggesting that despite a 
universal aspiration to good ends it may be morally legitimate 
that different people pursue different conceptions of those ends lO. 
8. lbidem p. 175. 
9. See e.g. Germain GRISEZ, Against Consequentalism, The American 
Journal of Jurisprudence, Vol. 23 (1978), pp. 21-72; Germain GRISEZ - Joseph 
BOYLE - John M. FINNIS, Practical Principies, "Moral Truth, and Ultimate 
Ends", The American Journal of Jurisprudence, Vol. 32 (1987), pp. 99-151. 
10. See Nicomachian Ethics I1I, 5 (1114a 31) where Aristotle seeks to 
show that even if this dictum were true, as many believe, it cannot be used as a 
deterministic justification for bad conduct because each person is morally 
responsible for the conceptions he acquires through habituation. 
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If we look at the deep structure of morality (aspiration to good 
ends), it appears the same everywhere and universalism seems to 
, 
be true, but if we look at the surface structure of morality 
(different practical solutions based on different conceptions of the 
good ends) cultural differences 'appear sharp and relativism seems 
to be true. A significant part of the controversy between moral 
universalists and moral relativists boils therefore down to a 
difference on the level of abstraction to be assigned to the notion 
of morality itself. 
Descriptive cultural moral relativismll is only of a limited 
interest in the human rights discourse. More interesting is a 
normative relativism12 according to which it is not merely a fact 
that moral beliefs differ but also somehow meet and right, and 
that different people therefore act differently: the way in which it 
is supposed to be meet and right may differ between different 
theories of normative relativismo Presently our primary object of 
interest is the supposed view that, due to cultural differences in 
moral beliefs, the human rights as they are interpreted in one 
culture -i.e. the liberal"West- are not as such directly applicable 
in other cultures. Such a claim can be supported with var~ous 
arguments. Among the most common ones are the three oft-cited 
arguments put forward by S. Prakash Sinha13: in other than 
Westem cultures (i) the fundamental unit of society is the family 
rather than the individual, (ii) the primary moral category is duty 
rather than right, and (iii) the primary methods of resolving 
conflicts are reconciliation, mediation or education rather than 
11. As Fernando R. TESÓN, "International Human Rights and Cultural 
Relativism", Virginia Journal of International Law 25 (1985) (869-898), 
p. 886, puts it. 
12. TESÓN, op. cit. , p. 887. Another kind of relativism.is metaethical 
,relativism (p. 886) which for various reasons asserts that it is impossible to 
discover absolute moral truths. Neither a descriptive or a metaethical relativist 
is predestined to be a normative relativist, as Tesón points out at p. 887 p. 
13. See SINHA, "Human Rights: A Non-Western Viewpoint", Rechts-
theorie, 1981 (76-91), p. 77. 
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adjudication. In one word, the liberal West is individualistic and 
places great importance on individual liberty to unrestrained 
desire satisfaction and abstract justice, whereas other cultures 
tend to be cornmunitarian and to place primary value on group 
harmony, restraint on the pursuit of individual interests, and 
material compromise. As the East sees it, the primary "wrong" in 
an interpersonal conflict is not the wrong inflicted by one of the 
parties on the other, but rather the wrong both parties inflict on 
social harmony. Recourse to litigation, or an appeal to subjetive 
rights, can hardly be a proper response to such a wrong, as it 
would only indicate the radical failure of the appealing party to 
contribute to the restoration of peace. For reasons like this it 
would not be right to impose the individualistic standard of 
liberal human rights on non-Westem cultures as it would only 
undermine the moral backbone of the latter with alien preoccu-
pations and concepts. 
In complement to the argument from moral scandal, it is often 
pointed out that non-Westem cultures lack even sorne of the very 
conceptual apparatus which would be needed to deal with the 
Westem notion of human rights: e.g. Jack Donnelly argues that 
the non-Westem cultures operate with an objective rather than 
subjective concept of right14 ("right" refers to what is objectively 
right for one rather than what is one's subjective right to 
something, a concept which was predominant even in the West 
before the so called time of Enlightenment), which makes the 
human rights difficult to understand for them. Similarly it is often 
pointed out that the concept of "individual" itself may be obscure 
to non-Westemers who are wont to define a person with reference 
to his relationships to other persons rather than in abstraction 
from all relationships_ It is obvious that if members of a culture 
do not understand what "individual" means, they can hardly 
14. See DONNELLY, "Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic 
Critique of Non-Western Conceptions of Human Rights", The American 
Political Science Review, 1982 (303-316), p. 303 pp. 
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appreciate the Westem conception of human rights, either. From 
a hermeneutical viewpoint one might refer to the unspeakable 
foreknowledge of each form of life which, due to the very fact of 
its being unarticulable, cannot be subjected to discursive 
reasoning; and, due to the fact of its precedence to every act of 
reasoning by every member of the form of life in question, is not 
open to being placed in doubt because it defines the very manner 
in which it is possible for the members to reason and the very 
scope of that which they can understand 15. Should that be the 
case, it would be difficult to see how members of different forms 
of life could meaningfully discuss the fundamental assumptions 
of their respective cultures: in the last analysis, every dialogue 
would end in a stalemate where each party would know that he is 
right and the other is wrong but could not articulate why. 
Nevertheless, the lack of cornmon concepts need not lead to a 
dead end. One of the starting points of Raimundo Panikkar' s 
account of the basis for cultural relativism is that all concepts are 
culture-boundI6, wherefore it is wrong even to think that there 
might be "trans-cultural" concepts or values l7. Instead, one 
should look for "cross-cultural" concepts and values which are 
based on a double awareness: that there is a "trans-cultural" 
reality to which cultural concepts and values respond, and that 
one'sculture-bound concepts allow the possibility of unders-
tanding the analogical relationship between the responses of 
different cultures to the "trans-cultural" cuesl8. Panikkar's theory 
is one of the most often cited theories of cultural moral relativism 
with regard to human rights. It merits c10ser attention not only for 
15. Such a view has been forwarded by e.g. Aulis AARNIO, The Rational 
as Reasonable. A Treatise on Legal Justification, D. Reidel, Dordrecht 1987, 
p. 67 pp. 
16. See PANIKKAR, "Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western 
Concept?", Diogenes, 1982 (75-102), p.84 pp. 
17. lbidem, p. 87. 
18. lbidem, p. 88. 
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this reason but also because it seems to match the requirements 
Wong places on an ideal theory of moral relativism19. Let us 
therefore recount its main points. 
PANIKKAR'S THEORY OF RELATIVISM 
Panikkar begins by pointing out several philosophical 
assumptions underlying the Westem concept of human rights: 
FirstIy20, the human rights discourse assumes the existence of a 
universal human nature, knowable by an equally universal human 
capacity, Le. reason, and essentially different from the nature of 
other creatures. Animals have no share in it, and the existence of 
creatures superior to men is doubtful. God may exist, but He is by 
and large considered irrelevant (except by those who base their 
faith in human rights in Christian doctrine). Secondly21, the 
human rights discourse assumes that human individuals have 
what is usually called dignity. This is because each individual is 
unique and irreducible to another, or to employ Kantian terms, an 
end in and for himself. Among the implications of this 
assumption is not only a distinction but a separation between 
individual and society: human beings are fundamentally indi-
viduals, and society is just an accidental or conventional supers-
tructure. This separation can easily wax into a contraposition: 
society is a potential threat to the integrity of the individual, and 
the human rights are tools for the protection of individual 
autonomy against society and state. A curious aspect of the 
assumption of individual dignity is that it vaguely echoes the 
Christian notion of man as God's image but at the same time 
makes every effort to disentangle itself from aH and any 
metaphysical and theological underpinnings, as if individual 
19. See p. 4 aboye. 
20. P. 80 p. 
21. P. 81 p. 
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dignity were somehow self-evident. Thirdly22, it is assumed that 
society consists of a conglomerate of free individuals who join 
forces in order to pursue goals they would be unable to reach each 
on his own. The individual s are prior to the society, not the other 
way round. As the society is a sum of separate individuals, its 
goals must be the sum of separate individual interests, too. 
Therefore, the state is to be a democratic expression for "the will 
of the people" which seeks to satisfy the sum of the individual 
wills. Usually this sum is determined by a majority, but 
minorities have a right to resist unfair impositions on their 
freedom. In theory, the freedom of no individual is to be 
restrained unless it impinge on the equal freedom of another 
individual. But the will of the individuals who make up the 
majority is decisive and sovereign, and there is no higher instance 
(like reason or divinity) to which one could appeal. Therefore, the 
supposed will of the majority will for most practical purposes 
justify any legal sanctions designed to limit the freedom of 
individuals in any respect. AH this, again, corroborates the 
implicit view that conflict between individual wills and between 
individual and state is the centrepiece of the human rights: their 
primary function is to be available for individual s for the pro-
tection of their freedom against unjustified interference by their 
feHow individual s and by the state. 
Next, Panikkar asks himself whether the concept of human 
rights, with the aforesaid inherent assumptions and implications, 
is a universal human concept, and answers that this can obviously 
not be the case, for three reasons23: for one thing, no concept is 
universal at the outset, as every concept is necessarily embedded 
in the context in which it was originally conceived and therefore 
primarily valid in it and nowhere else. This does not mean that a 
concept cannot become universally valid if it has a calling to it. 
22. P. 82 pp. 
23. P. 84 pp. 
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But for that it should be able to elíminate all incompatible or 
competing altemative concepts. Where the human rights are 
concemed, this would imply that not only the concept of human 
rights but also the culture in which it originates should be called 
on to become a universal culture24. This, 1 take it, is not only a 
cause for uneasiness among the non-Westem thinkers who fear 
for their own cultural identity, as Panikkar points out, but also a 
just cause in that it is highly unlíkely that all the other cultural 
responses to the problem of human dignity should be plainly 
falseo 
For another thing, Panikkar points out that not even the West 
is unanimous about the human rights25: Christian theology and 
Marxism are produced as examples of diverging assumptions and 
dissenting opinions. Furthermore, history shows that human 
rights are used in the Westem polítical struggle as a weapon with 
which the present victors may with a veneer of legitimacy 
determine whom they wish to inelude in or exelude from the elass 
of "proper" humans: for many Westemers the human rights are 
not really a moral ideal but a convenient fiction which effectively 
serves their irnmediate interests. 
Finally, from a "cross-cultural stance", as Panikkar puts it26, it 
is not only the case that most of the assumptions and implications 
enumerated aboye are not given in other cultures, but even the 
very problem of adequate response to human dignity is expe-
rienced there in a radically different way: not only the solution 
-the human rights- but also the problem which that solution is 
intended to resolve is conceived differently in the different 
cultures. The human rights are historically a growth of the 
Westem culture and a response to its "transition from ... mythical 
Gemeinschaften ... to a 'rationally'· and 'contractually' organized 
24. P.84. 
25. P. 84 pp. 
26. P. 86 pp.; cf. at footnotes 18 imd 19 aboye. 
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'modemity"'27. In that transition, something important has been 
lost: that the West has felt the need to positively declare and 
proc1aim human rights is a sign that the moral foundation on 
which they are supposed to rest has weakened28. Panikkar does 
not say why this has happened, but c1early the Westem separation 
of civil society and state from religion and morality is at issue 
here: the human rights are a necessary substitute for the lost link 
between politics, morality and religion. But if in other cultures 
this link has not been lost, as Panikkar goes on to argue, they will 
feel no spontaneous need for them. 
From a non-Westem viewpoint, then, one could very well 
accept the first assumption of a universal human nature, but at the 
same time deny that this nature should be qualitatively different 
from the nature -and rights- of other living things29. The 
universal nature of man may in principIe be knowable, too, but 
each culture knows it different1y through its own conceptual 
apparatus, and therefore it is not likely that one particular culture-
bound interpretation of it is the universal truth30. As to the second 
assumption conceming human dignity, it is essential to make a 
distinction between individual and personal dignity31: an indi-
vidual is an abstraction, a residue, as it were, which is supposedly 
left when a person has been abstracted fromall his interpersonal 
rela,tionships and other contextual determinants. Person, on the 
other hand, inc1udes one's relationships and róles both past, 
present and future. An individual is an isolated knot, whereas a 
person is a piece of network around that knot, "woven from the 
total fabric of the real". Without the knots there would be no net, 
27. P. 88. "Rational" and "modernity" are obviously to be understood here 
in Weberian terms. 
28. P. 88 p. 
29. P.89. 
30. P. 90. 
31. P. 90 p. Interestingly enough, Panikkar's distinction is almost equi-
. valent to the one which the catholic church likes to make in her moral and 
political doctrine. 
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but without the net the knots would not exist, either. From the 
perspective of the net it is wrong to hold that rights belong to the 
isolated individual: they must always be inherently relational, 
belonging to a relationship between persons. One particularly 
disconcerting aspect of the Westem conception of human rights is 
that, inasmuch as they are thought to belong to the individual in 
his abstraction, he can use them as if they were pieces of his 
private property which he is entitled to defend even so as to cause 
"unjust repercussions on others". In other words, a fully 
legitimate -Le. legitimate from the Westem perspective- use of 
individual rights as "trumps" may appear selfish and irnmoral 
from a person-oriented viewpoint inasmuch as it gives inadequate 
consideration to other people's needs, interests and wishes. 
Individual rights can make full sen se only in a context in which 
the "fabric of the real" has already been broken. 
The third Westem assumption, that a representative democracy 
of free individuals is the only legitimate way of organizing the 
state, is problematic, too, inasmuch as it presupposes that society 
is nothing but a confederation of isolated and absolutely equal 
individuals and forecloses the possibility of integrating society 
and state into a hierarchical conception of reality32. Human rights 
as a protective arsenal for numerical minorities against injustice 
from a majority make full sen se only in a poli tic al cornmunity 
which is conceived of as something independent and isolated 
from the orderof the universe. But if the contrary is the case, as 
Panikkar suggests with reference to e.g. India, human rights 
needs must be qualified with reference to how they or their use by 
particular persons relate to and affect the relevant conception of 
world order. In such a context, the rights per se can never be 
decisive moral criteria, fór much more important is the way they 
áre used: do they help to restore and maintain the world order? 
EqualIy liUle can democracy per se be an obligatory solution for 
32. P. 91 p. 
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govemment: the people should be allowed to keep the kind of 
govemment which best matches their conception of the place of 
the state in the world order33. Imposed democracy is equivalent to 
tyranny34. 
On the basis of the aforesaid discussion Panikkar finally 
conc1udes that, even if the human rights are a strictly Westem 
concept based on a long line of assumptions and implications 
which are incompatible with many aspects of non-Westem 
cultures, they can nevertheless work as a universal symbol for 
that which is morally important for all human beings35. 
Moreover, were the human rights advocates to resign their c1aim 
to universal validity, they would thereby contradict themselves in 
much the same way in which a Christian rnissionary would 
contradict himself if he resigned his belief in the universal 
salvation of Christ36. But it is in the nature of things that both· 
sides will necessarily believe they are in possession of the real 
truth, for every culture necessarily intends to look at reality as a 
whole. Nevertheless, each culture is only able to look at the world 
through its own window, which again allows only a partial visiono 
33. Panikkar for sorne reason fails to point out that even in the West the 
predominant political tradition for two thousand years after Aristotle advocated 
mixed government, i.e. a government which is based on such a mixture of 
democratic, aristocratic and monocratic institutions which best corresponds to 
the contextual demands and requirements placed on the particular state in 
question. According to this view, the form of government is clearly no end in 
itself: what is important is that it is best suited to serve the common good in the 
relevant circumstances. 
34. Note that the "enlightened" Montesquieu, as a chip off the old Platonic 
stock, held that not merely imposed democracy, but any democracy would be 
conducive to despotismo See e.g. De ['esprit des Lois VIII, 2, where it is 
explained how easily a democracy would corrupt into a tyranny; and XI,4, 
where it is pointed out that democracy is by its very nature not free, as the 
"moderation" brought about by a division of power is lacking. In other words, 
undivided democracy is more or les s equivalent to the rule of the mob dreaded 
by Plato as the ultimate degeneration of the state. 
35. P. 92 p. 
36. P.94. 
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Thus we always aim at the totality, yet see merely a part. Given 
this, it is important not to forget that we should not take the pars 
pro tot037. In this we are helped by Panikkar' s proposed method 
of diatopical hermeneutics38 with which we can seek a cross-
cultural39 understanding of homeomorphic equivalents40 in the 
different cultures. In different words, we canlook for functionally 
equivalent institutions which in the different cultural environ-
ments are called to respond to the particular way in which each 
culture conceptualizes the cross-culturally relevant question 
conceming the proper mode of understanding and respecting 
human dignity. On this basis, Panikkar concludes his essay with 
an exposition of how in a Hindoo context the homeomorphic 
equivalent to a human rights society would be a dharmic society, 
i.e. a society which properly respects the swadharma of all living 
creatures in thechain of existence41 . If human rights are to be a 
meaningful symbol in such a context, they must according to 
Panikkar be defined as not merely individual but personal, not 
merely human but extending to all beings, not merely rights but 
also duties and tasks towards the world, not isolatable from each 
other and the world but a harmonious whole which is in the 
service of the harmony of the whole world, and not absolute but 
relational (i.e. between related entities) and related to one's 
position or role in the universe (i.e. sensitive to each knot' s status 
in the net). 
37. P. 93 p. Cf. St. Paul's notion of partial vision in 1 Corinthians 
13: 9-12. 
38. P. 76 p. 
39. P. 87 p. 
40. P. 77 p. 
41. P. 95 pp. Note the similarity between the Augustinian etemallaw and 
the dharmic order! 
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TESÓN' S DEFENSE OF UNIVERSALISM 
In a well-known artiele Fernando Tesón has conveniently 
surnmarized sorne of the usual arguments levelled at moral 
relativism by defenders of the universal validity of the Western 
human rights discourse and standard42. He discusses two sets of 
arguments:' legal and moral. In the present context we are not 
interested in the juridical validity of his legal arguments with 
which he wants to show that cultural differences do not warrant 
any exceptions to the human rights43. We shall only point out a 
few outstanding philosophical difficulties which emerge from his 
treatment of the matter. We shall pay more attention to the moral 
arguments, with a view to assessing their intrinsic validity as well 
as their relative strength for the purpose of refuting Panikkar' s 
version of relativismo 
1) Legal arguments 
One of Tesón's legal arguments appeals to the non-di s-
crirnination dauses incorporated in the major human rights 
conventions44: according to him they can be given an inter-
pretation which extends the prohibition of discrirnination beyond 
national borders. In other words, to apply a different human rights 
standard to foreign citizens than to one's own people would 
amount to unlawful discrirnination. Now an obvious difficulty 
withthis argument is that it can only apply to one state's different 
treatment of its own and alíen citizens, not to how different states 
treat their respective citizens different1y. Besides, the criteria of 
discrimination are not fulfilled by different treatment as such: the 
difference must be unjust, too. And it is precisely under dispute in 
42. See footnote 4 aboye. 
43. TESÓN,op. cit., p. 875 pp. 
44. P. 878 p. 
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the present context whether cultural differences can constitute an 
acceptable justification to different human rights standards. If the 
answer is yes, then imposing an identical but alien standard on a 
foreign culture would be discriminatory because it failed to 
respect the right of all nations alike to live according to their own 
moral standards. Moreover, each culture believes in its own 
superiority: what would be the point, then, of appealing to unjust 
discrimination on behalf of a people who think that they are better 
off precisely for that reason? These questions lead us to another 
legal argument: the argument from self-determination45. 
In the intemational context one sometimes appeals to the 
principIes of self-determination and non-intervention in order to 
justify exceptions to the Westem human rights standard: no state 
should interfere with the autonomous cultural and political 
choice s of a foreign people46. But, says Tesón, this amounts 
to either a misconception or an outright rationalization for 
oppressive govemment: the supporters of relativism tend to 
define the interests of a people either "in mystical or aggregative 
terms that ignore or belittle individual preferences" or as "a plain 
rule of political power whereby those in power automatically are 
deemed to represent the people regardless oL. their human rights 
record"47. The argument appealing to the abuse of "culture" by an 
evil govemment is easy to answer by a relativist: a distinction 
must be made between culture and govemment, and evil 
govemments should by all means be opposed, but without 
unfounded prejudice against the cultures which they misuse for 
their oppressive purposes, lest the baby be thrown out with the 
bathwater, too. 
The argument from mystification is more to the point: I think 
it is quite true that a relativist can idealize his favourite culture(s) 
overly much and present them in all too 10ft Y and comprehensive 
45. P. 879 pp. 
46. P.881. 
47. P.882. 
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terms which create an unfounded impression of a unified and 
unanimous Culture which easily usurps theplace of the much 
more varied reality one can see if one examines the everyday 
lives of actual people living within the culture in question. And 1 
am sure that even Panikk:ar would, for example, agree that not aH 
people in India are equaHy immersed in a common quest for that 
dharmic society which he proposes as a Hindoo counterpart to 
government based on human rights. But even so, Tesón's 
argument fails to accomplish what it sets out to do. This is 
because it identifies invalid defiriitions of the interests of the 
people with definitions which ignore or belittle individual 
preferences. Thereby Tesón puts the cart before the horse, as the 
validity of his argument presupposes the truth of the conclusion 
which the argument is supposed to validate: individual pre-
ferences are a decisive criterion in the Western morality of human 
rights, but non-'Westem moralities tend for various reasons to 
deny precisely the importance and even relevance of individual 
preferences. Thus, Tesón's argument, intendend to show that 
relativists are wrong, depends on the anterior validity of the belief 
that the universalistic Westem view is right48. Therefore it in no 
way addresses the reasons which the non-Western cultures may 
have for holding that the "true" interests of their people are 
different from individual preferences. 
In a second argument against relativistic interpretations of self-
determÍnation Tesón says that the principIe of self-determÍnation 
is designed to protect a people against colonialism and unjustified 
foreign domination. But the human rights have the same purpose. 
48. Tesón highlights this line, or rather circle, of thought in very explicit 
words when he, on p. 883, appeals to a professor Schachter who "has con-
vincingly argued (that) the concept of human dignity implies that high priority 
should be given to individual choices... This concept however... contradicts 
many existing ideologies .. . ". To be sure it contradicts, but that it contradicts is 
no justification for the claim that the contradicted ideologies are wrong -unless 
it has been demonstrated that the contradicting concept is right! 
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Therefore they have nothing in cornmon "with colonial domi-
nation, imperialism and the other evils against which self-
determination was conceived"49. In other words, when the West 
actively exports its standard of human rights to non-Westem 
cultures it is only for their own good and therefore quite in order 
and in no way a violation of their autonomy. Now it is highly 
unlikely that the West knowingly conspires to use the human 
rights as aTrojan horse in order to continue its old colonial 
domination with new surreptitious methods designed to open the 
Third W orld economies to the "predatory economic forces in 
intemational society"50. But this is not the main point. To be sure, 
motive makes a difference, but not all the difference: an 
important part of a nation's self-determination is that it must be 
possible for it to choose on its own, to respond to its own 
problems in its own way, and that even at the risk of occasionally 
making the wrong choice. If wrong choice s are heteronomously 
excluded, there will be no room for genuinely autonomous self-
determination. Therefore, even if it were wrong for a nation to 
resist the Westem human rights, it would be wrong for the West 
to impose those rights on it against its own will. Besides, the faith 
of an unwilling convert to human rights is most likely to be little 
more than outward obedience and lip-service: a genuine adoption 
of a new moral code requires a spontaneous demand for it and a 
genuinely self-made choice. Only then can it provide for a 
satisfactory solution to problems which are relevant to the context 
in question. And only then can a people freely be a different 
people, a people of its own kind51 . Maybe even the West should 
place its trust in the likelihood that cultural moral codes will 
unavoidably evolve in order to meet the current demands, and if a 
demand arises for the human rights anywhere in the world, they 
49. P. 883 p. 
50. P. 896. In their individualism, the human rights can be feared to spread 
Western consumerism. 
51. Cf. WONG, op. cit., p. 174 pp. 
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will gain foothold there. Whether one should actively promote the 
growth of such a demand is a different question. Panikkar 
answers no, because it would imply a degeneration of the 
traditional non-Westem moralities52. Tesón says yes, because 
adopting a Westem standard would be an improvement. Donnelly 
underlines the fact that the human rights are a corrective response 
to certain malfunctions which are typical of Westem society53. It 
would seem to follow that in order for the Westem human rights 
to be a meaningful solution for the non-Westem cultures they 
would first have to be contaminated with the Westem social 
malfunctions to which the human rights pretend to be a solution. 
The question is whether they alredy have the disease, whether 
they will catch it willy-nilly, or if they are on their way to 
something altogether different. Should we judge, or should they? 
2) Philosophical and moral arguments 
From the perspective of moral philosophy, normative rela-
tivism is .according to Tesón implausible for three fundam~ntal 
reasons. The first reason is logical: normative relativism is 
inconsistent inasmuch as it on the one hand affirms that no moral 
principIe is universally valid but on the other hand c1aims that it 
is universally true that one ought to act in accordance with the 
principIes of one's own group54. Tesón admits that this incon-
sistency can technically be removed by defining the premises so 
that the existence of just one universally valid principIe -that of 
52. PANIKKAR,op. cit., p. 101. 
53. DONNELLY,op. cit., p. 312 pp. Cf. Andrew LEVINE, "Human Rights 
and Freedom", The Philosophy of Human Rights. lnternatiofl!ll Perspectives 
. (ed. Alan S. Rosenbaum), Aldwych Press, London 1981 (137-149), p. 145, 
where the author suggests that, even as a necessary corrective standard, the 
human rights are self-contradictory inasmuch as they simultaneously both 
defend and attack human dignity. 
54. P. 888 p. 
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normative relativism- is acknowledged, but it would be difficult 
to demonstrate that precisely the principIe of normative relativism 
would be the one universally valid principIe. The argument is 
familiar, even traditional, and sound in itself. Nevertheless, it 
manages to refute only that form of relativism which claims that 
it is a universally valid principIe that the members of each group 
always ought to follow the rules of their own moral community. 
But not every form of relativism makes this claim. On the 
contrary, plausible versions of relativism do not presuppose a full 
contextual determinism: one cultural environment may very well 
allow several different strategies of response to its moral 
problems, as well as it may allow various sets of criteria for 
evaluating them. Besides, their fittingness need not be lirnited to 
being a close match to the strictly local demands of the local 
culture: inasmuch as it is possible to take a cross-cultural 
standpoint, as Panikkar suggests, cross-cultural considerations 
may yield a standard for culture-bound moral codes, to055. A 
sound relativism will therefore not categorically exclude the 
potential relevance of considerations which stem from a larger 
context than the local cultural environment: as a context in which 
the culture in question is situated, the cross-cultural context has a 
relationship to it, and can thereby be another source for moral 
considerations which are none the less relative for it. Perhaps the 
most significant and interesting difference to be studied is not 
even the one between universalism and relativism in a strict 
sense, but the one between all those sorts of morality which 
purport to yield conc1usive, determinate and univocal solutions 
(i.e. one right answer to each problem) and those which allow for 
a multiplicity of correct solutions to one problem. 
Panikkar' s kind of relativism, for example, c1early argues that 
it is in the nature of things that each culture thinks its own 
morality is universally valid: therefore it is quite in order and in 
55. See pp. 7 and 12 aboye. 
LOOKING FOR COMMON GROUND 131 
no way inconsistent that e.g. a Westem human rights advocate on 
one level think that everyone all over the world should ~dopt the 
moral code he advocates, but on a different level admit that 
representatives of non-Westem cultures may for plausible reasons 
have a similar view of the superiority of their own moral codes, 
wherefore it cannot be their duty to accept the Westem moral 
code merely because Westemers have their plausible reasons to 
believe in its universal validity. Relativism is not black and white 
and not a matter of simple ought, for different modalities can be 
involved: even if one moral code were universally valid, those 
who have a mistaken view about it may still have a right to 
persist in their mistake as long as it satisfactorily serves the needs 
of their society as they perceive them from their own perspective. 
Or, even if a culture for sorne reason had a duty to adopt the 
moral code of another culture, the latter may still not have the 
right to impose it on the former. A right to recommend or to 
persuade does not as such imply a right to impose, let alone a 
right to force one's view on others -even if it were true-. 
Analogously, from the' perspective of a sound non-deterministic 
relativism., the sheer fact alone that a moral practice matches the 
actually perceived demands of a given cultural context cannot 
justify that moral practice absolutely, for even a relativist can still 
ask whether his self-perception adequately formulates the 
problems which morality is to resolve. 
The second reason why Tesón thinks normative cultural 
relativism is implausible is that it overlooks universalizability, 
which is "an important feature of moral discourse"56. He expli-
citly appeals to Alan Gewirth's theory of "generic consistency", 
an outgrowth of Kantian moral theory, which claims that we are 
logically committed to act in accordance to the generic rights of 
our recipients as well as of ourselves on pain of self-contra-
56. P. 889 pp. 
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diction57. It follows that morality allows for no "contingent" 
exceptions to anyone's basic rights. And cultural affiliation, for 
Tesón, is c1early such a "contingency" and thereby irrelevant as a 
criterion for establishing a morally significant difference which 
would justify a difference in treatment. Gewirth's theory of 
morality is well-known, and equally well-known is its failure 
when it purports to derive from a factual need a moral right58. But 
even if Gewirth, and everyone el se who held that univer-
salizability is a logically necessary criterion of morality were 
wrong, universalizability might still be a working criterion 
of "moral plausibility", whereas a relativist would "endorse" 
-whatever that means- "the implausible position" that moral 
judgments can contain proper names59. Now the obvious rela-
tivistic reply to this argument is that it is in no way evidently 
implausible that moral judgments can contain proper names. 
Proper names are highly relevant for e.g. the Socratic moral 
position: it makes an essential moral difference for me that 1 am 
the agent, and not the patient, nor an impartial observer, because 1 
am the only person whose morality is affected by my choices60. 
And if we join Aristotle in accepting that in sorne ways "such as 
one is, such does the end seem to one", why could not different 
agents have different moral standards, too, for instance because 
57. For Alan Gewirth's theory, see Gewirth: Reason and Morality. The 
University ofChicago Press, Chicago 1981. 
58. Interested readers are referred to Gewirth' s Ethical Rationalism. 
Critícal Essays with a Reply by Alan Gewirth (ed. Edwar Regís, Jr.), The 
university of Chicago Press, Chicago 1984. See also RENTTO, Prudentía lurís. 
The Art of the Good and the Just, The University of Turku, Turku 1988, p. 235 
pp. 
59. P. 890. 
60. In this way can very well be summarized the reasons for Socrates' 
refusal to accept a plea bargain in his tri al as well as a friendly offer of 
assistance to run away when he was awaiting execution, as recounted by Plato 
in his Apology and Críto. 
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their cultural affiliation provides them with different equipment 
for evaluating moral problems? 
Tesón foresees this answer and proceeds to refute it by 
offering a justification to his elaim that membership in a 
particular groups is not a morally relevant circumstance61• This is 
because one' s place of birth and cultural environment are factors 
unrelated to an individual's moral worth or entitlement to human 
rights. An individual is not accountable for having been born 
where he was born, and one cannot say that an individual 
deserves the circumstances in which he happens to be born. But 
here Tesón falls to the same trap as before: he presupposes that 
individual worth and individual entitlement are decisive 
considerations in order to show that the moral human rights 
universalism, which is based on the very ideas of individual 
worth and individual entitlement, is valido The argument amounts 
to little more than a tautology based on doubtful assumptions 
which at least sorne of the relativist positions explicitly deny. 
Thereby it completely fails to address the reasons for this 
difference in opinion which, as Panikkar metaphorically 
illustrates62, has to do with the difference between abstract 
individual knots and real persons integrated in the web. The 
different roles people have give rise to differences in the moral 
codes which are applicable to them63, and cultural affiliation is an 
obvious factor which can playa role (sic) in determining the 
moral content of those roles. To use Tesón's own exaple, it is 
quite correct to say that women in the Third W orld are equally 
eligible for human rights as Western women, but this will not 
61. P. 890 pp. 
62. See at footnote 31 aboye. 
63. For the sake of illustration, consider the following: it is commonplace 
even in the West to think that e.g. a mother's relationship to her own child 
implies moral obligations which are relative to her role as precisely that child's 
mother. Sorne of these obligations are clearly ones which a man-in-the street 
does not have towards the same child. But again, he may have similar obli-
gations to a child of his own, or one entrusted to his careo 
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imply that they must necessarily be accorded identical rights: if 
. they look at themselves as persons rather than individuals, they 
should be held entitled to rights which do not deny ihem the right 
(sic) to define themselves in the way which makes sense to them, 
rather than in the way which only makes sense to Westem 
suffragets_ 
But Tesón has another ace up his sleeve: he continues by 
pointing out that, even if it were true that cultural affiliation 
makes people see moral matters differently, this does not make 
them incapable of rational moral inquiry in which they can 
intelligently confront their concepts with alien concepts and novel 
situations64. To elaim the contrary would be to "confuse the 
circumstances in which one leams moral concepts with the 
meaning of those concepts"65. Therefore, says Tesón, a certain 
cultural determination of moral concepts will not imply 
normative cultural relativism in the strict sense, but leaves open 
the possibility to leam from other cultures in a cross-cultural 
dialogue66. Where this argument is concemed, Tesón would seem 
to be both right and wrong: His theoretical formulation is rather 
unhappy as it depends on a elear-cut distinction between language 
(concepts, semantics) and its context (circumstances in which a 
language is leamed, spoken and understood). If we take modem 
linguistic theory and hermeneutical philosophy seriously, we 
have no way of maintaining such a distinction: to be sure, 
concepts do have a life in abstraction from the context in which 
they are used, but they can hardly have a meaning which would 
be totally independent of context. Yet the material implications of 
this theoretically misconceived argument are right, and in no way 
incompatible with what e.g. Panikkar has been arguing for: a 
plausible relativism cannot be committed to a blind and total 
64. This is an argument related to Aristotle's, referred to in footnote 11 
aboye. 
65. P. 891. 
66. P.892. 
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cultural determinism which automatically validates every actual 
feature in every actual culture. But why indeed should we think 
that we, the enlightened Westemers, should not have anything to 
leam from all those cultures which have no spontaneous demand 
for Westem style human rights? Why should not we, too, be open 
to modify our positions? The attitude of a missionary is not 
genuinely open for dialogue -it only uses the word "dialogue" to 
cover its true, proselytizing aim. 
Finally, Tesón foresees the possibility that a relativist might 
counter his argument from universalizability by pointing out that 
he in fact universalizes one moral principIe, viz. the principIe of 
normative relativism itself67. Tesón's answer appeals to a 
distinction between substantive and formal principIes: he c1aims 
that the moral requirement of universalizability applies to 
substantive principIes which have a material content, whereas the 
principIe of normative relativism is merely a formal principIe of 
renvoi. Even if such a principIe were universally applied, the 
outcomes of its application could still be repugnant to the 
standard of universalizability. Now this argument has a certain 
strength ad hominem: quite certainly it can make one doubt 
whether there is any point in requiring universalizability if that 
principIe has no effect on its material applications. Nevertheless, 
it in no way helps to explain why the principIe of universa-
lizability should, in the first place, be presupposed as the ultimate 
criterion of moral rightness, nor does it even attempt to show why 
that principIe ought to be applied so as to overlook precisely 
cultural differences68. Besides, a principIe of renvoi is not 
necessarily a mere formality, for we may have material reasons to 
apply it, as for instance those relativists would say who defend 
the principIe of normative relativism as a way of respecting sorne 
other principIe like that of moral and political autonomy, or 
67. lbidem. 
68. Remember that a standard canonly be universalized between cases, 
individual s, or circumstances which bear a sufficient likeness to oneanother. 
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freedom of thought. In a like manner, the numerous formalities of 
municipal law have an implicit basis in the material aims and 
principIes of the state which provide a justification for the fact 
that their formally universal application need not yield materially 
identical particular outcomes. 
Tesón's third argument against normative relativism echoes 
-not altogether surprisingly- Kant69: normative relativists are at 
odds with the principIe that people ought to be treated as ends in 
themselves, and not as functions to the ends of others, inasmuch 
as they are ready to "impose upon individuals cultural standards 
that impair human rights". Even if they could show that their 
cornmunity needs authoritarian government, they would still have 
to show why individuals ought to surrender their rights to the 
ends of the cornmunity. Now whether Tesón's appeal to Kant is 
in itself valid is a rather complicated question which would 
require a long discussion of Kant' s notion of autonomy. Let me 
only point out that Kant explicitly holds that duties are primary to 
rights70, and duties towards a cornmunity of which one is a 
member can hardly be as such incompatible with a person's 
autonomy, but rather the contrary as long as they can be shown to 
be categorical71 . If we leave Kant aside, it is worth pointing out 
that Tesón is once again putting the cart before the horse: the 
argument presupposes the truth of the very view of society which 
is an essential part of the Western human rights ideology, viz. the 
idea that society consists of individuals whose private interests 
can be genuinely at odds with the cornmon interests of their 
69. P. 892 p. 
70. See Introduction (Einleitung) to Kant' s Anfangsgründe der Tugend-
lehre (i.e. Part 11 of his Die Metaphysik der Sitten). 
71. E.g. in his Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre (or Part 1 of Die Metaphysik 
der Sitten) Kant shows that people have a mutual duty to institute a state, and 
thereafter to obey the statutory laws, regardless of their contento But this is not 
incompatible with freedom: see Introduction to Die Metaphysik... (iv: 
Vorbegriffe); Einleitung in die Rechtslehre §§C-E; and Anfangsgründe der 
Rechtslehre ii, 1, §46. 
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cornmunity. But this is again precisely what spokesmen for non-
Westem cultures often deny 72 -and not only they, but also the 
Roman catholic social doctrine. Tesón's example is again rather 
illustrative: he suggests that the Islamic practice of discrimination 
against women could only be justified if each Islamic woman 
gave her subjective consent to it. IsIamic spokesmen would, 
nevertheless, probably deny the very relevance of individual 
preferences, indicating that a Westem-style "non-discrimination" 
wouId not only be bad for the Islamic cornmunity but also unjust 
towards the individual woman concemed. What Tesón would 
need to show here is a demonstration which could either convince 
a Moslem that it is fully compatible with Islam to let one's 
individual preferences override the cornmunitarian and religious 
standards of Islam! -or show him that he ought to give up his 
faith. 
ShouId the three previous arguments faiI to convince us of the 
impIausibility of normative relativism as a moral doctrine, Tesón 
gives one extra reason to discard it: it is "extremely conservative" 
in that it can be used as an alI-round justification for not 
undertaking any changes which might threaten the authoritarian 
traditions of a society. For this reason, normative relativism 
"amounts to the worst form of moral and legal positivism" 
ina~much as it justifies the view that all and any existing moral 
and political mores are necessarily correct merely because they 
are already existing 73. Needless to say, this argument from 
conservatism depends on a Ioosely Weberian view of tradition-
bound society as irrational because it is not open to deliberate 
72. Tesón escapes this difficulty with his wont strategy of criticizing the 
"mystical and holistic assumptions underlying relativism"; cf. at footnote 47 
~~ . 
73. P. 893 p. Cf. Plato, who idolized Egypt for its unchimging tradition (a 
proof of perfection!) and wanted to make sure with all political and educational 
. means that not even the thought that it might be possible to propose changes to 
the existing order would ever occur in the mind of a citizen. 
138 JUHA·PEKKA RENITO 
change in the same way as the modern Western society is. But 
this is hardly a valid notion, for a tradition is always a response to 
the demands of relevant reality -and the Western way of life 
grows from a tradition as well. No tradition would even begin to 
accumulate, were it not an adequate response to the demands of 
relevant reality. And no tradition will continue indefinitely 
merely because it is a tradition, if it loses its ability to respond 
adequately to those demands 74. History shows ample evidence of 
how traditions change and fall into disuse either when external 
circumstances change, or when the predominant perception of 
relevant reality changes in the context of a given culture. Quite 
obviously this can even take place as a result of receiving cross-
cultural influences. The pace of change is, to be sure, much 
slower in a traditional society than in the "enlightened"West. But 
that slowness alone hardly allows our conceited impatience to 
force the pace of development and impose on those more placid 
cultures concepts which they have not even had time to test in the 
reality which they find relevant. If the traditional authoritarian 
structures cease to be an adequate answer to the problems they 
face in the context of their own reality, they will eventually be 
discarded. If the human rights turn out to be the best way of 
adapting to the new world, as they perceive it, they will 
eventually be adopted. Perhaps history will show that there is, in 
the end, one true moral codeo But history is not over yet, and we 
should humbly admit that it is quite too early to pass judgment in 
our own favouL 
IN THE WA y OF A CONCLUSION 
Clearly, then, Tesón fails to demonstrate that a plausible and 
moderate relativism -which allows for the possibility of rational 
74. For an argument to this effect, see Louis J. MUÑOZ, "The Rationality 
of Tradition", Archiv für Rechts - und Sozialphilosophie, 1981 (197-216). 
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dialogue and mutual understanding across culturalboundaries and 
accepts that even traditional moral codes are rational responses to 
pertinent social needs and therefore in no way impervious to 
change- is implausible. To be sure, that implausible form of strict 
relativism -should anyone seriously support it- which is based on 
the rigid assumption that the contextual determination of morality 
is so complete as to leave the members of a given cornmunity no 
room for rational deliberation and choice is implausible as a 
meaningful moral theory. But not even this, 1 think, follows from 
the reasons put forward by Tesón. More likely, one COrnmon 
reason points towards the conclusion that neither normative 
relativism nor normative universalism can in their strict form be a 
suitable foundation for any meaningful conception of morality: if 
either of them were the right approach, morality would cease to 
make a difference to the moral agent. 
Were strict relativism right, all men would in the last analysis 
be mere receptors to and mouthpieces for values and conceptions 
determined by their membership in a given cornmunity: they 
could not make a difference with their moral choices even if they 
wanted to, because they could not help acting according to the 
morality which were given to them. Were strict universalism 
right, again, and people were in fact in a position to apply a 
universally valid moral code to all their problems, it would be the 
moral code which made their moral judgments for them, and they 
would have no room for genuinely personal moral choice s with 
which they could make a difference for their lives: meaningful 
moral choices would be excluded because there would be only 
one valid way of being moral, i.e. that of the universal codeo 
Hence the most powerful defense for a moderate relativism, or a 
moderate universalism if you like, is that it allows the people, 
wherever they live, to make a difference for their lives by 
admitting that there may be different ways of being moral which 
have a prima facie equal claim to validity as different but 
functionally analogical responses to the different but functionally 
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analogical interpretations of the human predicament in the 
different fractions of reality in which men live. In other words, it 
allows for both cultural and personal autonomy, and is not 
offended by the eventuality that a nation or a person may 
sometimes adopt a false moral codeo Without letting each nation 
take that risk, no genuine moral growth would be possible for 
them. An outward conversion, motivated by fear or desire, to 
paying lip service to an alien moral code would be a poor 
substitute, hardly much more than a play for the galleries. 
To be sure, history may very well forec1ose all further 
argument, as Panikkar suggests with his reference to "the 
megamachine" of the Western "techniculture" which may devour 
the non-Western parts of the world quite irrespective of the 
human rights ideology 75. If, and when, that happens, the 
traditional shangri-Ia of the idealistic relativists will no longer 
exist76. Thereafter, the language of rights77 may well be the most 
effective and appropriate language for the purpose of promoting a 
humane morality everywhere, due to the erosion of the social 
basis for the traditional cornmunitarian duties. One example of 
how it may turn out is the Chinese experience of the unintended 
side-effects of the (in)famous one child policy: children with no 
siblings, "the little emperors and empresses", tend quite 
spontaneously to grow into individualistically minded adults for 
whom it is quite easy to defy the ancestral cornmunitarian 
traditions. Butas long as worldviews alternative to the Western 
secular and individualistic anthropocentrism continue to answer 
to the spiritual and moral needs of different nations, we should 
seize the day and use well our opportunity to seek a mutual 
understanding and a middle ground which would support an 
75. Op.cit. , p. 101. 
76. As DONNELLY, op. cit. , p. 312 pp., poiots out. 
77. Cf. Joho FINNIS, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Clareodoo Press, 
Oxford 1980, p. 214 pp. 
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enlightened dialogue and argument rather than forcing 
"enlightenment" on those who still bide in darkness. 
We can seek a fruitful middle ground at least on two different 
levels between the extreme forms of universalism and relativismo 
One possibility is the strategy proposed by Sinha: we would all 
accept the nominal concept of the human rights as a universally 
valid starting point for dialogue, but at the same time we should 
admit that different cultures may legitimately read different 
interpretations and different priorities into that concepto This 
would entail a universal acceptance of the human rights as an 
abstract principIe, but qualify it with a second principIe which let 
each nation define its own catalogue of particular rights 78. A 
second possibility would be like the altemative proposed by 
Panikkar: we should question even the universal applicability of 
the abstract concept of human rights and look instead for its 
homeomorphic equivalents in the different cultures, admitting 
that the fundamental moral problems faced by human beings are 
materially similar everywhere, due to the cornmon human nature 
and condition, but that it is at the same time quite appropriate that 
the formal strategies of solving these common problems vary 
because different solutions are meaningful to the different 
cultures anct adequate to their respective interpretations of 
reality 79. The latter altemative ispreferable to the former, because 
it does not entice disagreeing parties to the diplomatic falsity of 
seeking apparent verbal agreements with implicit provisos 
conceming their different interpretation by each party. The cause 
of humanity would be best served with a genuinely open dialogue 
which has the courage to admit that the pertinent difference is not 
a simple difference between those who are right and those who 
are wrong, but between people who have different reasonable 
conceptions of what ought to be the appropriate criteria for 
distinguishing between right and wrong. 
78. SINHA, op.cit., p. 88 pp. 
79. PANIKKAR,op. cit., p. 162 pp. & p. 178 pp. 
